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In the present era of globalization, the relationship between
international trade and human rights is an issue of increasing
significance.1 In the background of the discussion, the economy
has grown increasingly global, while the respect for human
rights has advanced slowly in many States. Scholars have
argued that human rights are integrally related to international
trade, and vice versa, so the linkage of human rights with
international trade remains highly controversial.2 This article
argues that there is direct and appropriate involvement by
international trade in the protection of human rights.
This article begins by showing that a connection between
international trade and human rights exists. This relationship
is particularly realized upon examination of the provisions of
international agreements and their histories. Then, the
discussion turns to an examination of the scope of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), as incorporated in
the World Trade Organization Agreement ('WTO") more
particularly Article XX. Next, this article discusses the
procedure of Article XX, using the Article's introductory phrase.
This section details paragraphs (a), (b), and (d) of Article XX,
which constitute the most controversial sections concerning the
linkage of human rights and GATT provisions. The section
further discusses the requirements or application of the
paragraphs, related controversial issues, and the possible
inclusion of human rights within the Article's scope. Finally,
1. This article uses the term "human rights" where past scholarship has used
"labor standards." For a discussion on the terminology debate, see Adelle Blackett,
Whither Social Clause? Human Rights, Trade Theory and Treaty, 31 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 1, 26 (1999) (stating that the discussion is shifting from "labor
standards" to "human rights").
2. See HuMAN RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE (Lance A.
Compa & Stephen F. Diamond eds., 1996).
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this article argues that through careful application of these
paragraphs, the GATT can be used to protect human rights and
expand labor protection.
I. THE LINK BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND
HUMAN RIGHTS
Developing countries, free trade economists, and many
private enterprises in developed countries are the primary
opponents to the linkage between international trade and
human rights. 3 These opponents argue that conditioning free
trade on human rights is detrimental to the promotion of
welfare-enhancing free trade. Moreover, this linkage harms the
economy of developing countries because it limits their ability to
increase export trade, one of the best methods of economic
improvement. They reason that connecting trade with human
rights would deprive the South of its key comparative
advantage, namely the ability to use cheap labor.4 It is instead
simply a guise for protectionism. 5
Advocates of a link between human rights and free trade,
on the other hand, state that the export of products produced
under low standards results in unfair competition that
negatively affects working conditions in countries with higher
labor standards. 6 This disparity results in a "race to the bottom"
and weakens the working conditions in previously "high
standard" countries. 7 Other supporters argue that all countries
engaged in international trade should respect human rights.8
These authors deny that such a link would increase
protectionism. In contrast they believe that a linkage would
3. See Robert Howse & Makau Mutua, Protecting Human Rights in a Global
Economy, Rights & Democracy, at http://www.ichrdd.ca/111english/commdoc/
publications/globalization/wtoRightsGlob.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2000).
4. See id.
5. See generally Steven Charnovitz, The Influence of International Labour
Standards on the World Trading Regime: A Historical Overview, 126 INT'L LAB. REV.
565 (1987).
6. See J.M. Servais, The Social Clause in Trade Agreements: Wishful Thinking
or an Instrument of Social Progress?, 128 INT'L LAB. REV. 423 (1989) (noting that, if
a country allows its workers to be employed under conditions of work that are
miserable, it can export its products at lower prices and thus acquire an unfair
advantage over its competitors). According to this theory, because other countries
are not willing to lose their exports, they will react by lowering their standards as
well. Thus, the "race to the bottom" would be unavoidable.
7. See id.
8. See generally Charnovitz, supra note 5.
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eliminate one of the main justifications for trade restrictions.9
One supporter commented, "[wihat a strange idea. .. to find a
contradiction between the 'labor protectionism' of the
[International Labour Organization] and the theory of free or
freer trade... surely the attempt at nationalistic labor
protectionism is in contradiction with the attempt to secure
common labor standards which we are pursuing."0 A common
standard, supporters note, would prevent States from
restricting trade on the basis of domestic standards.11
9. See id.
10. Id. at 581 (quoting Albert Thomas, the first Director of the International
Labor Organization).
11. See generally Blackett, supra note 1, at 48-55 (considering linkage between
ILO labor regulations and trade, and discussing role of GATT in protecting rights);
Paul de Waart, Minimum Labor Standards in International Trade from a Legal
Perspective, in CHALLENGES TO THE NEW WTO 245, 256-61 (Pitou van Dijck & Gerit
Faber eds., 1996) (arguing for greater trade regulation to protect worker rights);
Michael R. Gadbaw & Michael T. Medwig, Multinational Enterprises and
International Labour Standards: Which Way for Development and Jobs?, in HUMAN
RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 141, 143-46 (Lance A. Compa &
Stephen F. Diamond eds., 1996) (highlighting legal and economic issues in the
linkage debate); Brian A. Langille, Labour Standards in the Globalized Economy
and the Free Trade /Fair Trade Debate, in INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS AND
ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE 329 (Werner Sengenberger & Duncan Campbell eds.,
1994) (emphasizing how the free/fair trade debate is central to the debate on labor
standards in the new economy); Virginia A. Leary, Workers' Rights and
International Trade, in 2 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: LEGAL ANALYSIS 177
(Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds. 1996) (discussing opposition to and
support of linkage between trade and rights); Alejandro Portes, By-passing the
Rules: The Dialectic of Labour Standards and Economic Interdependence, in
INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS AND ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE 159, 160
(Werner Sengenberger & Duncan Campbell eds., 1994) (explaining the relationship
between labor standards and economic strategies of less developed countries, and
presenting proposals for an alternative labor regime); Frank J. Garcia, The Global
Market and Human Rights: Trading Away the Human Rights Principle, 25 BROOK.
J. INT'L L. 51, 85-97 (1999) (analyzing effect of globalization on human rights law);
Robert Howse, The World Trade Organization and the Protection of Workers' Rights,
3 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 131 (1999) (advocating for the adoption of labor
rights-based trade related measures); Ray Marshall, Trade Linked Labor Standards,
37 ACAD. POL. SCI. 67-78 (1990) (encouraging the United States to use international
trade to grow world economies and to protect rights); Gijsbert Van Liemt, Minimum
Labor Standards and International Trade: Would a Social Clause Work?, 128 INT'L
LAB. REV. 433-34 (1989) (supporting adoption of a social clause for international
trade in order to institutionalize labor protection). See also Jagdish Bhagwati & T.
N. Srinivasan, Trade and the Environment: Does Environmental Diversity Detract
from the Case for Free Trade?, in 1 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 160 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996)(providing an
economic analysis of linkages generally); Herbert Feis, International Labor
Legislation in the Lights of Economic Theory, in INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS
AND ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE 29, 47 (Werner Sengenberger & Duncan
Campbell eds., 1994) (discussing whether international action should be aimed at
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The idea of connecting human rights and free trade through
international agreements is not a new one. In Article 7 of the
Havana Charter, nations first attempted to establish a legal
rights framework for trade issues by writing a provision devoted
to fair labor standards. 12 The Havana Charter, however, did not
enter into force. 13 Instead, GATT 1947 became effective. 14 The
establishment of the WTO replaced the GATT in 1995.15
From the beginning, the regulation of free trade issues has
been the GATT's main purpose, while human rights issues play
only a minor role. Unlike the Havana Charter, the GATT does
not explicitly incorporate any fair labor concerns.' 6 To date, the
majority of Contracting Parties have rejected attempts to
incorporate fair labor standards into the GATT.17  An
international commitment to recognized core labor standards,
uniform standards).
12. See Havana Charter, U.N. ESCOR, Conf. On Trade & Emp., U.N. Doc.
E/Conf.2/78, art. 7 (1950) [hereinafter Havana Charter] stating:
[t]he Members recognize that measures relating to employment must take
fully into account the rights of workers under inter-governmental
declarations, conventions and agreements. They recognize that all
countries have a common interest in the achievement and maintenance of
fair labor standards related to productivity, and thus in the improvement
of wages and working conditions as productivity may permit. The Members
recognize that unfair labor conditions, particularly in production for export,
create difficulties in international trade, and, accordingly, each Member
shall take whatever action may be appropriate and feasible to eliminate
such conditions within its territory.
13. The United States administration decided not to submit the Havana
Charter to the Congress. Without the support of the United States, the Havana
Charter and the planned establishment of the International Trade Organization
effectively died. See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK AND ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION
OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 21, 35-36 (2d ed. 1999)
14. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
15. Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 33
I.L.M. 1144 (1995) ["WTO Agreement"]. The WTO Agreement entered into force on
January 1, 1995. The WTO and the various Uruguay Round agreements have
replaced the GATT, but maintained its legal norms by incorporating the current
version of GATT, designated as GATT 1994. See generally JOHN H. JACKSON, THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: CONSTITUTION AND JURISPRUDENCE 12-29 (1998).
For the purposes of this article, unless context indicates otherwise, references to
GATT and the WTO incorporate this relationship.
16. See GATT supra note 14.
17. In general, the countries from the "North" favor an inclusion of "fair labor
standards" on the WTO agenda, and the countries from the "South" reject such an
inclusion. As a result, they are far from agreeing on a common position. See
generally Blackett, supra note 1, at 5-43; Howse, supra note 11, at 135-71
(discussing the general question of human rights and the GATT).
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however, is unquestionable.18 According to a majority of GATT
contracting parties, the International Labor Organization
("ILO") "is the competent body to set and deal with these
standards."19 While no one disputes ILO competence over labor
standards issues, this competence does not exclude the
attribution of any competence concerning fair labor standards to
the GATT. Because GATT procedures permit trade sanctions for
violations of its rules, it holds the potential for a bigger impact
on human rights than the ILO.
Because the GATT primarily has jurisdiction over free trade
matters, its competence with regard to labor standards must be
restricted to trade related labor standards or questions
emerging within the framework of trade. Furthermore, because
the GATT is not the appropriate arena to discuss contested
rights protections, the WTO should only consider fundamental
labor standards or human rights, which few contracting parties
oppose.20 Although the majority of the contracting parties
presently reject any consideration of labor standards, trade
related human rights could be taken into account within the
existing framework of the GATT. This article argues that Article
XX, paragraphs (a), (b), (d), and (e), could be applied to enforce
trade related human rights.21
Within the scope of this article, trade related human rights
are considered basic and universally recognized standards.
These standards encompass inter-alia freedom of association,
collective bargaining, the prohibition of forced labor, the
elimination of discrimination in employment and remuneration,
the outlawing of exploitation of children and the necessity of
18. For the discussion on the "internationally recognised core labor standards"
see infra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
19. World Trade Organization: Singapore Ministerial Declaration, adopted
December 13, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 218, 221 (1997); see also Jagdish Bhagwati, The
Agenda of the WTO, supra note 11, at 27; Charnovitz, supra note 5, at 565; Daniel S.
Ehrenberg, From Intention to Action: An ILO-GATTI WTO Enforcement Regime for
International Labor Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL
TRADE, supra note 11, at 163; Alice Enders, The Role of the WTO in Minimum
Standards, in CHALLENGES TO THE NEW WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, supra note
11, at 61; Erika de Wet, Labor Standards in the Globalized Economy: The Inclusion
of a Social Clause in the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade/ World Trade
Organization, 17 HUM. RTS. Q. 443 (1995) (discussing whether the WTO agenda
should incorporate labor standard issues).
20. Both human rights bodies and the ILO are better equipped for these kinds
of questions and debates.
21. Compare GATT, supra note 14, art. XX with Havana Charter, supra note
12, art. 45. Article XX is very similar to Article 45 of the Havana Charter, although
the latter was broader in scope.
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reasonable working conditions. The basic and universal nature
of these fundamental rights or standards is underlined by the
fact that: (1) labor standards doctrine consistently enumerates
these standards; 22 (2) the ILO has classified these rights as
"basic human rights;"23  (3) international and regional
instruments mention these standards, 24 (4) some are qualified
22. See Ray Marshall, The Importance of International Labour Standards in a
More Competitive Global Economy, in INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS AND
ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE, supra note 11, at 65, 71; Charnovitz, supra note 5, at
571; Virginia A. Leary, The Paradox of Workers' Rights as Human Rights, in HUMAN
RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 11, at 22, 28; Dirk
Van Evercooren & Rudi Delarue, La Probldmatique des Clauses Sociales, in
MONDIALISATION ET DROITS SocIAux: LA CLAUSE SOCIALE EN D9BAT 45, 48 (Denis
Horman ed., 1997).
23. See International Labor Organization, ILO Conventions, at
http://ilolex.ilo.ch:1567/public/English/ docs/convdisp.htm (last visited Sept. 27,
2000) (listing all ILO conventions). The ILO drafted conventions on a number of
human rights subjects, categorized them as "human rights" conventions, and
emphasized the importance of their ratification and their implementation. See, e.g.,
Convention Concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment, June 26, 1973,
1015 U.N.T.S. 297 (aiming at the abolition of child labor, stipulating that the
minimum age for admission to employment shall not be less than the age of
completion of compulsory schooling or, in any case, fifteen years); Convention
Concerning Discrimination in respect of Employment and Occupation, June 25,
1958, 362 U.N.T.S. 31 (calling for national policies to eliminate discrimination in
access to employment, training and working conditions, on grounds of race, color,
sex, religion, political opinion, or social origin and to promote equal opportunity and
treatment); Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labor, June 25, 1957,
320 U.N.T.S. 291 (prohibiting the use of any form of forced or compulsory labor as a
means of political coercion or education, punishment for the expression of political or
ideological views, workforce mobilization, labor discipline, punishment for
participation in strikes, or discrimination); Convention concerning Equal
Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value, June 29,
1951, 165 U.N.T.S. 303 (calling for equal pay for men and women for work of equal
value); Convention Concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to
Organize and to Bargain Collectively, July 1, 1949, 96 U.N.T.S. 257 (providing for
protection against anti-union discrimination, for protection of workers' and
employers' organizations against acts of interference by each other, and for
measures to promote collective bargaining); Convention Concerning Freedom of
Association and Protection of the Right to Organize, July 9, 1948, 68 U.N.T.S. 17
(establishing the right of all workers and employers to form and join organizations of
their own choosing without prior authorization, and lays down a series of guarantees
for the free functioning of organizations without interference by the public
authorities); Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labor, June 26, 1930, 39
U.N.T.S. 291 (requiring the suppression of forced or compulsory labor in all its
forms. Certain exceptions are permitted, such as military service, convict labor
properly supervised, emergencies such as wars, fires, earthquakes, and other
catastrophic events).
24. See e.g. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, Jun. 24-27, 1981,
arts. 5, 10, 15, 21 I.L.M. 58; American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969,
arts. 6, 15, 16, 9 I.L.M. 99; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
adopted Dec. 19, 1966, arts. 8, 21, 26, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on
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as jus cogens norms or obligations erga omnes; and (5) these
fundamental rights have been considered, inter-alia, by the ILO
Director as a precondition for the enjoyment of all other rights.25
The acceptance of trade related human rights is thus nearly
universal with only a few States contesting their validity.
II. GATT ARTICLE XX
A. ARTICLE XX: SCOPE AND PROCEDURE
Article XX, entitled General Exceptions, primarily
addresses the general exceptions available under the GATT for
purposes of public policy. 26 It lists protection of public morals, 27
the protection of human, animal or plant life or health,
28
measures securing compliance with GATT-consistent laws, 29
and the prohibition of prison labor3° among the public policy
related exceptions. This provision authorizes governments to
apply otherwise illegal measures when such measures are
necessary to deal with the listed social or economic policy
problems, relieving the contracting parties from the obligations
imposed by the GATT.
Article XX cannot be interpreted as accommodating general
social or economic considerations, but rather as an express
policy decision to allow measures considered harmful to market
access when a sufficient social or economic policy justification
exists. The reasons must relate to an exception specifically
listed in the provision. 31 Because Article XX deals with only
exceptions, the provision does not allow broad justifications to
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, arts. 7, 8, 10, 993
U.N.T.S. 3; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, arts. 4, 11, 213 U.N.T.S. 221; Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810, arts. 4, 20, 23 (1948).
25. See International Trade and Labor Standards: The ILO Director speaks out
[Speech entitled: "Trade and Labor Standards: Can Common Rules be Agreed?"], 135
INT'L LAB. REV. 230 (1996).
26. See GATT, supra note 14, art. XX.
27. Id. art. XX(a).
28. Id. art. XX(b).
29. Id. art. XX(d).
30. Id. art. XX(e).
31. See GATT, supra note 14, art. XX(a)-(j). See also John H. Mathis, Trade
Related Environmental Measures in the GATT, 2 LEG. ISSUES EUR. INTEGRATION 47
(1991) (arguing that this narrow interpretation "illustrates the GATT preference to
permit trade flows").
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escape from a contracting party's GATT obligations. A GATT
panel confirmed this limited interpretation of the character of
Article XX. 32 The Tuna-Dolphin Panel stated, "Article XX is a
limited and conditional exception from obligations under other
provisions of the General Agreement, and not a positive rule
establishing obligations in itself. Therefore, the practice of
panels has been to interpret Article XX narrowly."33
A contracting party may invoke Article XX to justify
violations of the GATT, however, it is necessary that a national
measure, or some part thereof, is contrary to a party's GATT
obligations. While the violation of any GATT obligation can
trigger the application of Article XX, the enumerated exceptions
particularly apply to national measures inconsistent with
Article III, 34 which ensures that national policies apply equally
to domestic and imported products. In other words, a party
cannot treat domestic products more favorably than foreign
products. 35 Since the application of Article XX legitimizes a
nation's disadvantageous treatment of imported products, it
necessarily justifies the unequal handling of imports with
respect to domestic products. Contracting parties also regularly
invoke Article XX with regard to violations of Article VI and
Article XI.36
32. See GATT Dispute Panel Report on United States: Restrictions on Imports
of Tuna, Aug. 16, 1991, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155, 204 (1993) [hereinafter
Tuna-Dolphin Panel].
33. Id. at 197. The Tuna cases involved United States restrictions banning the
importation of fish or fish products caught with technology tending to kill dolphins
and other marine mammals. The Tuna-Dolphin Panel issued a report, not adopted
by the contracting parties, suggesting that the U.S. ban on importation of Mexican
tuna caught using other methods violated the GATT. Additionally, the report
asserted that neither Article XX(b) nor Article XX(g) justified the restrictions. See id.
at 205. See also GATT Dispute Panel Report on United States: Section 337 of the
Tariff Act of 1930, Nov. 7, 1989, GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 345, 392-96 (1989)
[hereinafter Section 337 Panel].
34. See GATT, supra note 14, art. III (entitled "National Treatment on Internal
Taxation and Regulation" and aimed at preventing discriminatory internal taxation
and regulation).
35. See GATT, supra note 14, art. III para. 1, which reads in part, "internal
taxes and other internal charges, and laws, regulations, and requirements.. .should
not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic
production." Further, paragraph 4 of the same article says that "[tihe products of the
territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other
contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded
to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and
requirements affecting their internal sale."
36. See GATT, supra note 14, art. VI, XI (dealing with Anti-Dumping and
Countervailing Duties and "General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions,
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A complaint by a contracting party regarding the trade
measures of another contracting party sets in motion the
dispute settlement procedures of the WTO. 37 A WTO dispute
panel will first determine whether a party's trade measure
violates a provision of the GATT. Upon finding a trade measure
to be inconsistent with the GATT, the panel will then turn to
Article XX to determine whether the measure is nonetheless
justified under an exception. If an exception is justified
pursuant to Article XX, then the panel will compare inconsistent
elements of the measure with the conditions enumerated in
Article XX.
In order to use Article XX to justify a trade measure
designed to enhance labor conditions or protect human rights, a
party must meet several conditions. 38 First, a nation must show
that the policy meets the standards in the introductory phrase,
which requires nondiscriminatory trade policies. Second, a
nation must show that the adopted measure falls within one of
the policy areas recognized in the General Exceptions. Finally,
the nation must show the connection between the policy and
trade and that the policy is needed in order to reach the stated
end.
B. INTRODUCTORY PHRASE OF ARTICLE XX
The introductory phrase, sometime called the "chapeau,"
applies once a contracting party invokes Article XX.39
Compliance with its substantive requirements is the
precondition for application of one or more of the exceptions
listed in Article XX.40 The chapeau reads as follows:
respectively").
37. See WTO Agreement, supra note 15, Annex 2 (establishing the WTO
dispute settlement system). See generally JACKSON, supra note 15, at 59; see also
Debra P. Steger, WTO Dispute Settlement, THE WTO AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
REGULATION 53 (Ruttley et al. eds. 1998).
38. See GATT Dispute Panel Report on United States: Standards for
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Jan. 26, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 274 (1996)
[hereinafter Gasoline Panel]. See also Section 337 Panel, supra note 33, at 392.
39. See Spring Assembles Panel, infra note 42 (indicating that, in order for a
contracting party to undertake a legal measure on the basis of Article XX, the
measure must also satisfy the conditions of the introductory phrase).
40. See Section 337 Panel, supra note 33, at 392. The conditions enunciated in
the introductory phrase must be satisfied for any measure enacted on the basis of
any of the exceptions listed in Article XX. The fulfillment of the conditions
mentioned in paragraphs (a) through (j) of the article is not sufficient; all measures
must also be neither arbitrary, discriminatory, nor a disguised restriction on trade.
2001]
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Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail,
or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement
by any contracting party of measures...41
The introductory phrase contains two requirements for all
measures falling within the scope of Article XX: "arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination" and "disguised restriction on
international trade."42
1. Arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
The main purpose of this first condition, arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination, is to restrict attempts to legitimize
discrimination against certain countries. 43  Within the
framework of the Article, however, this provision does not
outlaw every kind of discrimination. Since a lawful employment
of Article XX suspends the observance of GATT obligations, it
discriminates by definition against the countries affected by its
application as opposed to all other countries. Any application of
Article XX amounts, therefore, to discrimination. This explains
the addition of the adjectives "arbitrary" and "unjustifiable" to
this provision.
The Tuna I Panel noted the importance of these
qualifications. 44 After taking notice of a discriminatory measure
towards Canada, the Panel stated that it "felt that the
discrimination of Canada in this case might not necessarily
have been arbitrary or unjustifiable."4 The Panel pointed out
the difference between "justifiable discrimination" and
"arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination."46 This difference is
significant because, as mentioned above, any country affected by
41. GATT, supra note 14, art. XX.
42. GATT Dispute Panel Report on United States: Imports of Certain
Automotive Spring Assemblies, May 26, 1983, GATT B.I.S.D. (30th Supp.) at 107,
125 (1983) [hereinafter Spring Assemblies Panel] (noting that "the Preamble of
Article XX made it clear that it was the application of the measure and not the
measure itself that needed to be examined").
43. See id. at 125.
44. See GATT Panel Report on United States: Prohibition of Imports of Tuna
and Tuna Products from Canada, February 22, 1982, GATT B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) at
91 (1982) [hereinafter Tuna I Panel] (involving complaint by Canada alleging a U.S.
restraint on Canadian imports violated the GATT).
45. Id. at 108.
46. See id. (finding that the U.S. measure merited further analysis under
Article XX).
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an Article XX measure experiences discrimination. Yet, to avoid
abuses based on the General Exceptions provision, the
"arbitrary or unjustifiable" criterion must also be taken into
consideration. "If any type of discrimination were to constitute
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination within the meaning of
Article XX, no party could ever successfully invoke the said
Article."47 For a legitimate employment of Article XX a certain
amount of discrimination is, therefore, unavoidable provided it
is not arbitrary or unjustifiable.
Can arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination exist between
two countries where the same conditions prevail? So far, no
GATT or WTO panel has taken a position on this question.48 In
the Tuna-Dolphin case, involving discrimination based on
environmental concerns, the United States denied allegations of
discrimination and argued that "its measures were not applied
in a manner that would constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same
conditions prevail, because the [Marine Mammal Protection Act]
applied evenly to all countries."49 The Tuna-Dolphin Panel did
not analyze this argument in its findings, perhaps because the
category of "conditions" lacked definition. The category might be
restricted to the one the United States contemplated, but
"conditions" might refer to political, economic, cultural or other
categories as well. To conclude, it seems difficult to establish
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between two countries
where the same conditions prevail.
2. "Disguised Restriction"
The goal of this second requirement is to ensure that a
contracting party may not attempt to cover up protectionist
practices by invoking Article XX. 50 The European Community
underlined the important function of this requirement in stating
47. Jan Klabbers, Jurisprudence in International Trade Law: Article XX of
GATT, 26 J. WORLD TRADE 63, 90 (1992).
48. See id. (noting Kiabbers' belief that the "same conditions" criterion has
become "something of a dead-letter clause").
49. The conditions the United States had in mind concerned the criteria of the
purse seine nets used by the fishermen. Tuna-Dolphin Panel, supra note 32, at 178.
The same question was also discussed in the WTO Appellate Body on the United
States: Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Oct. 12, 1998,
38 I.L.M. 118 (1998) [hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle Appellate Report].
50. [T]he history of this condition suggests that it was intended as a check
against attempts to mask protectionist pursuits...." Steve Charnovitz, Exploring
the Environmental Exceptions in GATT Article XX, 25 J. WORLD TRADE 37, 47 (1991)
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that, "It]his condition was intended to ensure that measures
taken avowedly for one of the purposes in the ten sub-
paragraphs, (a) to (j) of the Article, were not in reality taken
primarily to restrict trade, through being more restrictive than
necessary to achieve the avowed result."51
The analysis of the disguised restriction condition by
various panels, however, has weakened this intended purpose
by focusing on publication. In one of the earliest cases
concerning this requirement, the Tuna I Panel noted that a
publicly announced trade measure could not be considered
disguised.5 2 The Panel also emphasized the importance of the
publication of the trade measure in question in its decision
regarding U.S. restrictions on the importation of certain
automotive parts.53 This underscoring of publication stresses the
word disguised in the term "disguised restriction."
Several sources have criticized the disguised restriction
requirement test as applied by numerous panels. Contracting
parties involved in GATT disputes, as well as third parties
interested both in these disputes and the general governing
doctrine, provide sound critiques showing why the soft
interpretation of disguised restriction needs to be changed.5 4
Many States have resisted the publication-focused emphasis,
preferring a broader interpretation instead. "[Tihe publication of
the trade effects was [not] the sole criterion for determining
whether there is a disguised restriction on international trade.
It could also happen that the disguise would consist of cloaking
a trade measure under considerations of another order."55
51. Section 337 Panel, supra note 33, at 377.
52. See Tuna I Panel, supra note 44, at 108 (explaining that "the United States
action should not be considered to be a disguised restriction on international trade,
noting that the United States prohibition of imports of tuna and tuna products from
Canada had been taken as a trade measure and publicly announced as such").
53. See Spring Assemblies Panel, supra note 42, at 125 (noting that, because
the exclusion order was published in the Federal Register and based on a valid
patent whose infringement had been clearly established, no disguised trade
restriction could be identified).
54. For example, in the Section 337 Panel, Japan did not use this line of
reasoning when rejecting the United States argument as to the existence of a
"disguised restriction." In paragraph 4.4, the Panel considered Japan's argument
that Section 337 procedures were not "necessary" and were "a disguised
restriction" on international trade in terms of Article XX(d), because the
procedures and orders issued at the border under Article XX(d) treated
imported products less favourably than domestically produced goods and
because they could hinder the distribution of genuine goods.
Section 337 Panel, supra note 33, at 379.
55. Tuna-Dolphin Panel, supra note 32, at 179.
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A comparison of the Panel's publication centered
interpretation with the interpretation provisions of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties 56 (hereinafter Vienna
Convention) may justify disagreement with the panels'
interpretation of "disguised restriction." According to the Vienna
Convention, a treaty must be interpreted in the light of its
object and purpose.5 7 There is no doubt that the reduction of
barriers to international trade is the most important objective of
the GATT.58 If interpreted in light of this purpose, the
overemphasis on publication is therefore unwarranted.
An overemphasis on publication can be abused and serve to
disguise protectionist measures. This emphasis risks possible
misuse of Article XX, where blatantly protectionist measures
might pass the disguised regulation test precisely because of
their blatancy.,9 Steven Charnovitz expressed his concern with
such blatantly protectionist measures.60  Jan Klabbers,
considering the interpretation of disguised restriction, harshly
critiques the Panel interpretation, calling it manifestly absurd.61
Referring to the non-protectionist character of the GATT,
Klabbers continues, "lh]ence, it would be absurd to allow certain
of these barriers on the mere basis of their being publicly
announced."62 They show why the soft interpretation of
"disguised restriction" would be in need of change in the future.
56. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May
23, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter "Vienna Convention"].
57. See id. art. 31(a), at 691-92. "A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
context and in the light of its object and purpose." Id. Since the Vienna Convention
cannot be applied retroactively, its treaty law character applies only to cases where
ratification of the GATT occurred after ratification of the Vienna Convention. Where
this is not applicable, its substantive provisions are taken into consideration as rules
of customary international law. See DAVID J. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
INTERNATIONAL LAw 813-16 (5thed. 1998).
58. See GATT, supra note 14, pmbl. The text of the GATT preamble
demonstrates that the agreement was concluded in order to reduce international
trade barriers to a minimum.
59. See Charnovitz, supra note 50, at 48.
60. See id.
61. See Klabbers, supra note 47, at 91 (considering the interpretation within
the confines of Article 32(b) of the Vienna Convention). Article 32(b) reads:
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including
the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion,
in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of Article
31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to
Article 31(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
Vienna Convention, supra note 56, at 692.
62. See id. at 91.
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A more stringent requirement for the interpretation of the
"disguised restriction" condition would be an important bulwark
against abuses of Article XX.
As debates over the interpretation of the requirements of
the chapeau indicate, it is difficult to meet the requirements
necessary to legitimately invoke Article XX. Questions such as
"what does arbitrary or unjustifiable mean?" or " when does a
measure constitute protectionism?" are indeed difficult to
answer and may well be the reason why the panels have so far
avoided such questions. The very raison d'0tre of the panels is,
however, to provide answers to unclear issues. As is already the
case with other provisions of Article XX, the panels should not
be afraid to address these questions. Until the WTO addresses
these issues involving the chapeau requirements, parties will
continue to struggle in their attempts to use Article XX.
Similar issues of interpretation and application currently
limit the use of Article XX to protect rights and advance
workers' rights. An examination of the relevant portions of the
agreement highlights these problems.
C. POLICIES PROTECTED WITHIN THE GENERAL EXCEPTIONS
1. Article XX(a): Protection of Public Morals
Article XX(a) is the first provision considered with regard to
the suspension of GATT obligations based on violations of trade
related human rights.63 Because neither GATT nor WTO bodies
have interpreted or evaluated Article XX(a), its interpretation
remains difficult and uncertain. In order to successfully use
Article XX(a) to defend an adopted policy, a party must prove
that the substance of the policy of the measure, for which the
provision was invoked, is protection of public morals. Because a
definition of Article XX(a) is essential for its use, the purpose of
this section is to define "public moral."
Australia's position in the Tuna-Dolphin case resulted in
one useful definition of "public moral."64 Australia argued that
"Article XX(a)... could justify measures regarding inhumane
treatment of animals, if such measures applied equally to
63. The second provision (whether the measure for which the exception is being
invoked is "necessary" to protected human, animal life, or health) is analyzed below.
See infra, section C(2).
64. See Tuna-Dolphin Panel, supra note 32.
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domestic and foreign animal products."65 Australia did not
mention human rights violations as within the scope of Article
XX(a), but limited itself to the inhumane treatment of animals. 66
If its view on inhumane treatment of animals is accepted,
however, there is no reason why the same should not be valid
for the treatment of human beings. Under this interpretation,
Article XX(a) could justify trade actions concerning the
inhumane treatment of human beings.67
In order to practically use the inhumane treatment
standard, a working definition is needed. 68 The European
Commission of Human Rights provided one possible definition
within the framework of torture.69 According to the Greek Case,
inhumane treatment involves, "at least such treatment as
deliberately causes severe suffering, mental or physical, which
in the particular situation, is unjustifiable." 0
The use of the term "deliberately" is apparently "aimed at
specifying intentional rather than merely negligent ill-
treatment and is presumably designed to shield those who
might unwittingly cause suffering."7' The word "unjustifiable"
exempts certain treatment; first, suffering that must be for no
other reason than the benefit of the recipient; and second,
situations where the recipient freely gives consent.7 2 Under this
standard, inhumane treatment could amount to a violation of
public morals. For example, a violation of human rights, such as
poor work conditions, might satisfy the definition of inhumane
treatment.
65. Id. at 181.
66. See id.
67. In order to remain consistent with its larger purpose, the WTO's concern
for human rights shall be limited to trade related rights.
68. An exact definition is not needed at this time and should ultimately be
determined by a WTO Panel.
69. See Greek Case, 1969 Y.B. EUR. CONW. ON H.R. 12 (Eur. Ct. H.R.). After the
coup d' dtat in 1967 the Greek military government proclaimed a state of emergency
and announced a series of derogations under Article 15 of the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Denmark, the
Netherlands, Norway and Sweden referred this to European Commission in order to
clarify whether there was an "emergency threatening the life of the nation" (within
the criteria set in Article 15), and if so, whether the actions undertaken by the
military government were "strictly required by the exigencies of the situation." The
prohibition against torture and other articles of the Convention were allegedly
violated. See id.
70. Id. at 504.
71. NIGEL S. RODLEY, THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW 74 (1987).
72. See id. at 75-76.
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Australia notably conditioned its concern with the measures
regarding inhumane treatment of animals on "measures applied
equally to domestic and foreign animal products."73 As a result,
it seemed not to object to the extraterritorial application of
Article XX(a). 74 An Article XX(a) measure, "applied equally to
domestic and foreign animal products," 5 could, with regard to
the inhumane treatment of animals, apply outside the country
that implemented the measure as well. For example, a party
might suspend the GATT under this section as it relates to
inhumane treatment of animals abroad.
An analogous application of this proposal to human beings
would read as follows: A domestic measure regarding the
inhumane treatment of employees - such as poor work
conditions and circumstances deliberately causing severe and
unjustifiable suffering (mental or physical) which applied
equally to national and foreign products connected with the
inhumane treatment of workers would justify the invocation of
Article XX(a). The cessation of the observance of the GATT for
products associated with the violation of human rights, thereby
causing inhumane treatment of employees would become a
legitimate act.76
Another way to include human rights in Article XX(a) is to
consider certain human rights as "moral standards."77 In an
analysis about an eventual ILO or WTO social clause, one
author suggests limiting the reach of such a clause "to very
serious violations of fundamental workers' rights."78 She limits
these serious fundamental workers' rights to:
the minimal international labor standards of freedom of association,
the right to collective bargaining, and the prohibition of forced labor
(considered to include egregious use of child labor) and discrimination
in employment. These labor standards are the basic human rights
standards of the ILO, they are incorporated in the two main
international covenants on human rights, and they are moral
73. See Tuna-Dolphin Panel, supra note 32.
74. For a more detailed discussion about extraterritoriality see infra section
WI(E).
75. The equal application of measures to domestic and foreign products is
necessary to satisfy the "non-arbitrary and non-justifiable discrimination"
requirement of the introductory phrase of Article XX. See supra notes 40-49 and
accompanying text.
76. For the debate about a limited application of Article XX measures to final
products see infra section II(C)(2)(b). With regard to the controversy about the
legitimacy of"extraterritorial" action see infra section HI(E).
77. See Leary, supra note 11, at 221.
78. Id.
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standards that few countries would contest and that most have
accepted by virtue of membership in the ILO or ratification of human
rights conventions.
79
This proposal is clearly compatible with considering certain
human rights as "public morals." Her argument that these
rights constitute "moral standards that few countries would
contest" seems correct. Her limitation of "moral standards" to
fundamental workers' rights can be attributed to the more
controversial social-clause debate.80
Even though few countries contest the need to protect
human rights, many States consider the need for such
protection only reluctantly.81 Therefore, a link between Article
XX(a) and the general observance of this limited category of
rights likely will be difficult to obtain. In order to mitigate the
resistance of countries to link an international trade provision -
such as Article XX(a) with fundamental workers' rights or
"moral standards," compliance with these selected workers'
rights, in certain specific situations, should be restricted. In
other words, only if a link to trade is established should
fundamental workers' rights and "moral standards" be
examined within the context of Article XX(a). Based on Article
XX(a), a violation of these rights would then provoke the
suspension of observance of GATT provisions.
2. Article XX(b): Protection of Life or Health
Article XX(b) also validates certain trade restrictions that
otherwise violate the general principles of the GATT.82 Like
Article XX(a), no contracting party has ever invoked Article
XX(b) for human rights issues. This section examines whether
Article XX(b) could justify the invocation of otherwise unlawful
practices when used to protect human rights. While not
presently used to protect human rights broadly, Contracting
Parties have resorted to Article XX(b) to protect human or
animal life, or health.8 3 In these cases, the panels interpreted
79. Id; see also Blackett, supra note 1, at 34.
80. See Leary, supra note 11. See generally supra, note 11.
81. See Leary, supra note 11, at 204.
82. See GATT, supra note 14, art. XX(b) ("necessary to protect human, animal
or plant life or health").
83. See e.g. Tuna I Panel, supra note 44; Tuna-Dolphin Panel, supra note 32
(invoking Article XX(b) to protect animal life); see also GATT Dispute Panel Report
on Thailand: Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, 30
I.L.M. 1122 (Nov. 7, 1990) [hereinafter Thai Cigarettes Panel] (using Article XX(b)
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the Article's content and indicated its conditions of application.8 4
Because there is no reason why future panels dealing with
eventual human rights issues should deviate from these
findings, the examination of existing panel findings will be the
point of departure. These panels start their analysis by
examining the nature of the policy used to invoke the exception.
(a) Improvement of Workplace Conditions
A policy compatible with trade related human rights could
be consistent with this first condition if it falls within the range
of policies designed "to protect human life or health."
Regulations on dangerous work conditions certainly comply with
these requirements.8 5 In light of the fact that human life and
health are linked to workplace conditions, GATT inconsistent
measures for improvement thereof could be based on Article
XX(b). Any labor conditions causing severe health problems or
risking the life of employees could provoke a legal application of
paragraph (b) of the General Exceptions clause.
(b) Methods of Production and Practice
One of the important legal issues facing the interpretation
of Article XX(b) is the scope of its application. Do the exceptional
GATT measures only apply to the final product as such or do
they also apply to the methods of production and practice
("MPP") included in making the final product? If extended to
apply to the MPP of the final product, Article XX(b) could serve
as a basis for the defense of a much broader variety of trade
related human rights. Taking MPP into account remains highly
disputed and no panel has ever approved their consideration. So
far, only GATT inconsistent measures limited to the final
product have been confirmed. Thailand's ban on the importation
of cigarettes from the United States is the classic example of the
application of Article XX(b).86 The Thai Cigarettes case,
for human life protection).
84. See e.g. Tuna I Panel, supra note 44; Tuna-Dolphin Panel, supra note 32;
Thai Cigarettes Panel, supra note 83; Section 337 Panel, supra note 33; WTO Panel
Report on Australia: Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, June 12, 1998,
WTO Doc. WT/DS18/R (1998), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/
dispue/distabe.htm [hereinafter Salmon Panel].
85. Policies concerning the security and health of workers, such workers
exposed to dangerous chemical materials without protections, are the main matters
of interest.
86. See Thai Cigarettes Panel, supra note 83, discussing Thailand's ban on the
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however, deals only with the final product.8 7 It does not consider
the MPP of the product.
Panel decisions interpreting other portions of the GATT,
and including MPP in their decisions, involve situations
sufficiently analogous to those in Article XX(b) cases to extend
their analysis. For example, the Tuna-Dolphin Panel examined
the question of the scope of the protection measures.88 In its
decision, the Panel stated that the United States' protection
measures concerning the production methods of tuna violated
the GATT.89 It further held that Article XX(b) did not legitimize
this violation. 90 In making its decision, the Panel first decided
that concerns about the production methods violated GATT
Article 111.91 The Panel found the inconsistency with Article III
in the fact that,
the standard of Article III - namely that imported products be
accorded no less favorable treatment than domestic products -
required a comparison between products of the exporting and
importing countries, and not a comparison between production
regulations ... that had no effect on the product as such. Therefore,
the United States could not embargo imports of tuna products from
Mexico simply because Mexico's regulations affecting the production of
tuna did not satisfy United States regulations.
92
importation of cigarettes and other tobacco preparations. The sale of domestic
cigarettes, however, was authorized. The United States complained that the import
restrictions violated the GATT and argued that neither Article XI:2(c) nor Article
XX(b) provided justification therefor. Thailand argued that the import restrictions
were justified under Article XX(b).
87. See id.
88. See Tuna-Dolphin Panel, supra note 32. For a more comprehensive
discussion of the Tuna-Dolphin Panel decision see Don Mayer and David Hoch,
International Environmental Protection and the GATT: The Tuna/Dolphin
Controversy, 31 AM. BUS. L.J. 187 (1993); Carol J. Miller and Jennifer L. Roston,
WTO Scrutiny v. Environmental Objectives: Assessment of the International Dolphin
Conservation Program Act, 37 AM. Bus. L.J. 73 (1999); Hon. R. Kenton Musgrove,
The GATT-Tuna Dolphin Dispute: An Update, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 957 (1993);
Richard W. Parker, The Use and Abuse of Trade Leverage to Protect the Global
Commons: What We Can Learn From the Dolphin-Tuna Conflict, 12 GEO. INT'L
ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1999); Paul J. Yechout, In the Wake of Tuna II: New Possibilities
for GATT-Compliant Environmental Standards, note, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 247
(1996); Dolphins and Tuna: An Analysis of the Second GATT Panel Report, 24 ELR
10567 (1994).
89. See Tuna-Dolphin Panel, supra note 32, at 195.
90. Id. at 200.
91. See id. at 195.
92. Gadbaw & Medwig, supra note 11, at 150 (citing the Tuna-Dolphin Panel).
Based on the decision in the Tuna-Dolphin case, the imposition of production
regulations could not be justified under Article II. Although this Panel was dealing
with environmental regulation, trade related human rights could just as easily fit
2001]
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
The United States argued that even if the Panel declared its
actions inconsistent with GATT obligations, they would be valid
under various provisions of Article XX, including Article XX(b).93
They argued that the ban was necessary for the protection of the
life and health of dolphins.94
The Panel rejected the United States' Article XX(b)
justification for three major reasons. First, Article XX(b)'s
limitation to trade measures; second, the non-extraterritorial
application of Article XX(b); and third, the necessity of the trade
measure in question. 95 While the Panel confirmed the sovereign
right of each contracting party to establish its own human,
animal or plant life or health standards, it clarified, however,
that the application of Article XX(b) referred only to trade
measures violating GATT obligations. 96 Broader life or health
regulations established by the Contracting Parties did not fall
under Article XX(b).9 7 The Panel provided the following reason
for that narrow view:
[Ihf the broad interpretation of Article XX(b) suggested by the United
States were accepted, each contracting party could unilaterally
determine the life or health protection policies from which other
contracting parties could not deviate without jeopardizing their rights
under the General Agreement. The General Agreement would then no
longer constitute a multilateral framework for trade among all
contracting parties but would provide legal security only in respect of
trade between a limited number of contracting parties with identical
internal regulations.
98
the category of 'production regulation" to which the Panel referred. See id. There is
no reason why a future panel could not find a trade-related human rights or labor
standard regulation inconsistent with Article III because of the same reasons. See
GATT, supra note 14, art. III.
The same analysis applies to Article XI entitled "General Elimination of
Quantitative Restrictions." See Tuna-Dolphin Panel, supra, note 32, at 201. Trade
related human rights measures are also qualified as "quantitative restrictions" and
are inconsistent with Article XI of the GATT. See id.
93. See id. at 168. The other United States' arguments, with regard to Article
XX, were based on paragraphs (d) and (g).
94. See Tuna-Dolphin Panel, supra note 32, at 170. This statement indicates
that the production related risks could be used to justify regulations. If export goods
produced under dangerous conditions should be limited to protect animal life, than
by similar reasoning, they should be limited to protect trade related human rights. If
export goods are produced under dangerous working conditions, a ban on their
import could be necessary for the protection of the life and health of the workers
involved in their production process.
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Thus, the Panel rejected Article XX(b)'s use to protect
domestic environmental policies violating the GATT. This
conclusion, which attempted to avoid unilateral determination
of life or health protection policies, weakened the multilateral
framework of the GATT for trade purposes. If upheld in future
disputes, the analogous application of the Panel's decision to the
MPP, trade related human rights regulations resulting in
measures violating the GATT could not be based on Article
XX(b). The findings of the Panel, however, can be challenged
from two different perspectives.
The first problem with the Panel's decision involves its fear
of unilateral determination. Since the trade-related human
rights considered in this article refer to fundamental workers'
rights that only a few countries contest, unilateral action with
respect to their observance should not be confused with the
unilateral acts to which the Panel referred. Today, the
overwhelming majority of countries, in one way or another,
complies with the obligation to respect these rights and no
longer questions the international customary law character of
these rights.99 Because of their customary or jus cogens nature,
efforts to gain an international respect for these rights do not
aim to unilaterally determine health or life policies. To the
contrary, they seek to enforce respect for fundamental workers'
rights as required by international human rights laws or by ILO
Conventions.
Similarly, the international community endorsed the goal of
achieving these rights by including them in the Preamble of the
GATT.100 The Preamble states that the contracting parties
recognize that "their relations in the field of trade and economic
endeavor should be conducted with a view to raising standards
of living."101 The Preamble's reference to raising standards of
99. It is true that these rights are violated in many countries. This violation,
however, does not weaken their customary nature, because the countries concerned
either deny the allegations or seek to justify their behavior. This reasoning is
analyzed in Rodley, supra note 71, at 63-64. For a general study of customary
international rules see Peter Haggenmacher, La Doctrine Des Deux Eldments Du
Droit Coutumier Dans La Pratique De La Cour Internationale, 90 REVUE G9NPRALE
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 5 (1986).
100. See GATT, supra note 14, pmbl.
101. Id.; see also WTO Agreement, supra note 15, pmbl. The Shrimp-Turtle
Appellate Report noted the importance of the Preamble within the context of
environmental issues. See Shrimp-Turtle Appellate Report, supra note 49, at 162.
The Vienna Convention confirms that for the interpretation of a treaty its preamble
must be taken into account. See Vienna Convention, supra note 56, art. 31(2), at 692.
This part of the Preamble has to be considered for the interpretation of the GATT.
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living is therefore significant to the analysis of the Panel's
"unilateral determination fear." Trade related human rights,
such as work conditions, undoubtedly contribute to living
standards. 102 As more countries guarantee these rights, living
standards will rise. By implementing policies aimed towards
these ends, the countries do not unilaterally determine the
health or protection policies, but comply with the text of the
Preamble and arguably with obligations agreed upon in a
multilateral framework. For this reason, the Tuna-Dolphin
Panel's decision concerning unilateral determination cannot be
accepted.
The other problem with the Panel's rejection of the United
States' position relates to its concern that taking the Article into
consideration could weaken the multilateral trade character of
the GATT.103 The Panel gave preference to the free trade nature
of the GATT and rejected the pro-environment argument. 1 4 In
other words, it "gave great weight to trade policy arguments
while giving short shrift to other important international
values. 105
If the WTO applies this standard to fundamental workers'
rights in the MPP a similar outcome would result; priority
would be given to free trade. There is, however, key precedent
allowing a departure from this standard. This decision arguably
conflicts with the language of report of the Thai Cigarettes
Panel, asserting that Article XX(b) "clearly allowed contracting
parties to give priority to human health over trade
liberalization." 106
The conclusion of the Thai Cigarettes Panel demonstrates
that there is no clear solution in the case of a conflict between
See also MANFRED NOwAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR
COMMENTARY 2 (1993) (stating that the legal significance of the preamble is
generally recognized under international law).
102. See Thai Cigarettes Panel, supra note 83, at 1129 (noting Thailand's
reference to the Preamble as it sought to prove that smoking among other things
lowered the standard of living; unfortunately, the Panel did not deliberate this
interesting point).
103. See Tuna-Dolphin Panel, supra note 32, at 199.
104. See id.
105. See Eric Christensen & Samantha Geffin, GATT Sets Its Net on
Environmental Regulation: The GATT Panel Ruling on Mexican Yellowfin Tuna
Imports and the Need for Reform of the International Trading System, 23 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REV. 569, 586 (1991-92); see also Shrimp-Turtle Appellate Report,
supra note 49 (taking a similar position).
106. Thai Cigarettes Panel, supra note 83, at 1137. With regard to the legal
value of panel decisions, see infra note 159 and accompanying text.
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trade under the GATT and the protection of life and health. It is
important to note that Article XX(b) overrides the GATT's
concern for trade liberalization with its General Exceptions. 1 7
Regrettably, the Tuna-Dolphin Panel ignored this point.
Therefore, the conclusion reached by the Thai Cigarettes Panel
must be given priority over the Tuna-Dolphin Panel's decision.
Finally, an exclusion of MPP non-trade concerns from the
analysis of Article XX would have contradictory effects on other
Article XX norms. Robert Howse, an internationally recognized
expert on trade regulation and labor rights, explains this
conflict:
Even if one thinks that Article XX(a) is somehow limited to matters
such as the regulation of pornography, imposing a limitation on its
scope to measures on "products" would prevent a country from banning
imports of pornographic films made with children or involving (but not
necessarily depicting) involuntary acts of sex and other illegal violence.
One has only to think of this example to see how unduly and
irrationally restrictive of the ability of members to protect public
morals Article XX(a) would be if it excluded PPM [MPP]-based
measures. Indeed, unless independently harmful, any product
manufactured in the context of racketeering or organized crime would
have to be given the full protection of GATT!108
Furthermore, Article XX(b) allows a contracting party's
health interests to prevail over the trade interests of other
contracting parties. 10 9 Overall, a blind subordination of non-
trade matters to trade concerns would undermine many of the
economic advantages that the GATT creates.
The drafters of the GATT did not specifically designate the
Article XX measures that relate to MPP, but an examination of
Article XX(e) 110 shows that it should be applied to measures
107. See generally, WTO Panel Report on United States: Import Prohibition of
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 37 I.L.M. 832, 846 (Nov. 3, 1998) [hereinafter
Shrimp-Turtle Panel], deciding that Article XX is to be interpreted with reference to
and consideration of the object and purpose of the GATT as a whole). See also Id. at
849 (stating that Article XX allows Members to take measures contrary to its GATT
obligations if and only if it does not abuse the object and purpose of the GATT by
preventing market access and non-discriminatory treatment).
108. Howse, supra note 11, at 143-44.
109. See Frieder Roessler, Diverging Domestic Policies and Multilateral Trade
Integration, in 2 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: LEGAL ANALYSIS, supra note 11,
at 34-35. See also Shrimp-Turtle Panel, supra note 107, at 843 (stating that "Article
XX can accommodate a broad range of measures aiming at the conservation and
preservation of the environment").
110. See GATT, supra note 14. Article XX(e) permits GATT inconsistent
measures "relating to the products of prison labor." Although no panel has analyzed
this exception in depth, one panel summarily noted that "GATT 1994 indicated that
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concerning the MPP of imported goods. Although the paragraph
does not contain any specific provision to this effect, one can
deduce this from its structure because a ban on products made
by prison labor refers to the conditions under which the product
was produced. Thus, Article XX(e) takes into account the MPP
under which the final product is produced. It is unlikely that the
drafters of the GATT had another interpretation in mind. The
same is applicable to the other paragraphs of Article XX, namely
paragraphs (a), (b), and (d). 111 If the drafters had not wanted the
latter paragraphs to be interpreted in the same way as
paragraph (e) with regard to the MPP, they would have made
such an intention explicit.112 Since the wording of the
paragraphs (a), (b), and (d) does not contain any statement
excluding Article XX measures based on MPP, it follows that
these concerns can also be taken into account.
To date, GATT and WTO panels have interpreted the
measures referred to in Article XX narrowly. The EEC
Regulation Panel made this very clear in its report, where it is
stated that, "the panel considered that the 'measures' referred to
in Article XX is the measure requiring justification under
Article XX."113 Even though no panel expressly has considered
MPP, decisions concerning the environment have demonstrated
that panels' decisions would not incorporate MPP. 114 Within the
meaning of Article III of the GATT, as presently understood,
any embargo on imports is limited to the products as such, and
cannot be extended to the MPP. 15 Article XX(b) is therefore
currently restricted to final products as such and the MPP of
products are not taken into account. In light of the expanded
protections that a consideration of MPP would allow, the WTO
trade measures could take effect through their influence on countries." See Shrimp-
Turtle Panel, supra note 107 (stating that "since the management of prisons was
almost universally within the sphere of governments, Article XX(e) unquestionably
was intended to allow trade measures to [sic] that could serve to influence the
policies and practices of governments").
111. This line of reasoning is supported by statutory canons of interpretation: (1)
the "presumption of consistent usage," and (2) a breed of in pari materia, which
normally dictates that provisions should be construed together when their scope and
aim are similar, or, as is true in regards to Article XX, the legal framework embraces
similar purposes or policies.
112. A related canon supports this interpretation: ex expressio unius est exclussio
alterius.
113. GATT Dispute Panel Report on EEC: Regulation on Imports of Parts and
Components, 30 I.L.M. 1075, 1113 (May 16, 1990) [hereinafter EEC Regulation
Panel].
114. See Shrimp-Turtle Panel, supra note 107, at 851.
115. See Gasoline Panel, supra note 38, at 294.
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should also depart from current practice and allow the
application of Article XX(b) to protect work conditions by taking
the MPP of traded products into consideration.
3. Article XX(d): Necessary To Secure Compliance With Laws
Or Regulations
Measures that are inconsistent with the GATT can also be
based on paragraph (d) of Article XX. 116 Although several panels
analyzed the legal validity of various Article XX(d) measures,
surprisingly, no contracting party has referred to human rights.
Article XX(d) creates the following exception:
[N]ecessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are
not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, including those
relating to customs enforcement, the enforcement of monopolies
operated under paragraph 4 of Article II and Article XVII, the
protection of patents, trade marks and copyrights, and the prevention
of deceptive practices; 1
17
With regard to measures inconsistent with the GATT,
"Article XX(d) covers only measures designed to prevent actions
that would be illegal under the laws or regulations."'18 It is
important to note that the measures violating the GATT must
consist of the actions needed to enforce the laws or regulations
and not of the laws or regulations themselves.
(a) The Scope of "Laws or Regulations"
Since the first condition with regard to the application of
Article XX(d) is the consistency of the laws or regulations with
GATT, an examination of the understanding and the scope of
these laws or regulations is indispensable. This section looks at
a number of controversies related to the scope of Article XX(d),
including whether the article refers to domestic or international
law, whether reviewing boards should consider the text or the
purpose of potentially conflicting laws, and whether the list of
exceptions is exhaustive.
The numerous panels that have dealt with the meaning of
the phrase "laws or regulations" have agreed that the "'laws or
regulations' to be examined under sub-paragraph (d) are the
laws or regulations the contracting party invoking Article XX(d)
116. GATT, supra note 14, art. XX(d).
117. Id.
118. EEC Regulation Panel, supra note 113, at 1114.
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claims to secure compliance with."119 Thus, the panels were loyal
to the wording of paragraph (d) and interpreted it literally. They
did not make a deep examination of the paragraph. Ab initio,
this interpretation is unclear as to whether there is a domestic
or international character to the laws or regulations in question.
Subsequent panels have maintained the domestic nature of the
laws or regulations, noting that, "Article XX(d) [authorizes] a
contracting party to secure compliance with its national laws or
regulations.. .the protection of patents was one of the few areas
of national laws and regulations expressly mentioned in Article
XX(d)."1120
Without any clearly persuasive reasoning, later panels have
adopted this restrictive interpretation concerning the nature or
the laws or regulations. Had the drafters of GATT contemplated
such a restrictive understanding, they would have chosen
wording that indicates such intent. 121 The addition of the terms
"internal" or "domestic" to the laws or regulations would have
been enough to justify such an interpretation. However, the
drafters did not add these terms and, therefore, it is very
unlikely that the panels' limited interpretation of the laws or
regulations corresponds with the drafters' intent. Accordingly,
the panels' restrictive view with regard to the domestic or
international character of the laws or regulations is incorrect.
In any case, because internal law cannot violate
international law,122 it is legitimate to ask whether it is
important to differentiate between domestic and international
law with regard to Article XX(d). It is very important to
distinguish domestic laws or regulations from international ones
because of the impact on state sovereignty. Complaining parties
119. See, e.g., id. at 1113.
120. E.g. Spring Assemblies Panel, supra note 42, at 124.
121. This is particularly important because the provisions of the GATT are to be
read in light of their ordinary meaning. Augmenting or deleting the language of
provisions clearly violates such a rule. See Vienna Convention, infra note 196 and
accompanying text (discussing ordinary meaning). See generally WTO Appellate
Body Report on Canada: Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry, May
31, 2000, WTO Doc. DS142, 139, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e
dispu.e/distabe.htm [hereinafter Automotive Industry Appellate Report]
(examining the "ordinary meaning" of Article 3.1(b) to commence the analysis of its
scope).
122. See The Vienna Convention, supra note 56, art. 27, at 690. "A party may
not invoke the provisions of its internal law for its failure to perform a treaty." Id.
See also Advisory Opinion No. 44, Treatment of Polish Nationals and Other Persons
of Polish Origin or Speech in the Danzig Territory, 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 44, at
24 (affirming that this principle is not restricted to treaties and can be considered as
customary international law).
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often regard measures adopted to secure compliance with the
implementing party's domestic laws or regulations as
interference in the internal affairs of the complaining party.123
These measures are rejected as being in violation of the
sovereignty principle. 124 Whereas these arguments can be
considered plausible in the case of domestic laws or regulations,
they are of doubtful validity with regard to disputes concerning
international laws or regulations. As a result, there is no
persuasive argument for limiting the application of Article
XX(d) to domestic laws or regulations.
The second debate involves whether Article XX(d) limits
only laws, which are textually inconsistent with the GATT, or if
it also looks at the objectives underlying the law or regulation in
question. "Ifn order for a measure to be covered by Article
XX(d), it must secure compliance with laws or regulations that
are not inconsistent with the General Agreement."125 The laws
or regulations in question, therefore, must be textually
consistent with the GATT provisions. The clear wording of the
paragraph does not permit an alternative interpretation. It
does, however, leave open whether Article XX(d) also applies to
laws or regulations with purposes inconsistent with the GATT.
However, consideration of statutes' objectives is
inconsistent with Article XX(d). This view is shared by the EEC
Regulation Panel, which stated, "this provision does not refer to
objectives of laws or regulations but only to laws or regulations.
This suggests that Article XX(d) merely covers measures to
secure compliance with laws and regulations as such and not
with their objectives." 126 Because panels are not considered
competent to judge the policy objectives of the contracting
123. Sovereignty refers to a State's complete independence to conduct its own
affairs. It is an integral part of the principles of equality of States and of territorial
integrity and political independence. The community of States is based on the
principle of sovereign equality of all of its members. See UN CHARTER art. 2, para. 1.
International law, however, restricts State sovereignty. The adoption of
international treaties and the establishment of international customary law are,
indeed, a limitation of sovereignty. In accepting international obligations, State
sovereignty is either removed or diminished over the obligations in question. Since
States have the sovereign right to manifest their adherence to international law, a
violation of international law cannot be defended on the grounds of sovereignty. See
Debra Steger, The Impact of GATTIWTO Rule Making and Rule-Interpretation on
the Sovereignty of States, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE CANADIAN COUNCIL ON
INTERNATIONAL LAw 138 (Oct. 1992) (discussing sovereignty).
124. See id.
125. EEC Regulation Panel, supra note 113, at 1113 (quotations omitted).
126. Id. at 1114.
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parties, 121 this limited interpretation is not surprising. A panel's
examination is restricted to the validity of the instruments
chosen by the contracting parties for the attainment of such
policy objectives. 128 Therefore, Article XX(d) refers to the laws or
regulations as such.
Another question that causes disagreement concerns the
debate over whether the list of laws or regulations in Article
XX(d) is exhaustive, or whether it can be expanded to other laws
or regulations. The answer to this question centers on the
incorporation of the term "including" in the wording of
paragraph (d). This term refers to the laws or regulations and
its use implies that the list is not exhaustive and only
enumerates some examples. The EEC Regulation Panel
confirmed this by referring to the list as "examples of the laws
and regulations indicated in Article XX(d)."' 29 The Spring
Assemblies Panel took a similar position in referring to the
United States' argument concerning unfair methods of
competition or unfair acts. 130 It stated that, "Article XX(d) did
not mention unfair methods of competition or unfair acts as
such. The drafters of that Article seemed to have had in mind
national laws which were not inconsistent with the GATT." 131
Because the drafters had national laws in mind, the list
enumerates only some laws or regulations and is not
exhaustive. 32 Laws or regulations referring to other areas are
not necessarily excluded. However, they must not be
inconsistent with the provisions of the GATT.
Because the examples listed in Article XX(d) are not
exclusive, it is important to examine whether the invocation of
non-listed examples must correspond with the specified list. In
other words, need the non-enumerated examples be the same
kind of laws or regulations as the ones mentioned in Article
XX(d)? The paragraph is again silent on this question. For
example, it is not clear from the text whether the laws or
127. See Roessler, supra note 109, at 34-35 (discussing panel's incompetence
with regard to the interpretation of policy objectives).
128. See WTO Panel Report on Canada: Certain Measures Concerning
Periodicals, Mar. 14, 1997, WTO Doc. WT/DS31/R, para. 5.9, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu e/distab-e.htm [hereinafter Periodicals
Panel].
129. EEC Regulation Panel, supra note 113, at 1114.
130. See Spring Assemblies Panel, supra note 42, at 114.
131. Id. at 120.
132. For the debate about the controversial limitation to national laws or
regulations see supra Section II(C)(3).
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regulations with regard to the prevention of deceptive practices,
mentioned in the last example of Article XX(d), are restricted to
deceptive practices with regard to the other listed examples or
whether general deceptive practices are included.
Some excerpts from the Section 337 Panel's report shed
some light on this issue through the analysis of in rem exclusion
orders. 133 The Panel stated the following:
[T]aking action against infringing products at the source, that is at the
point of their production, would generally be more difficult in respect
of imported products than in respect of products of national origin:
imported products are produced outside the jurisdiction of national
enforcement bodies and it is seldom feasible to secure enforcement of
the rulings of a court of the country of importation by local courts in
the country of production. In personam action against importers would
not in all cases be an adequate substitute for action against the
manufacturer, not only because importers might be very numerous
and not easily brought in to a single judicial proceeding, but also, and
more importantly, because as soon as activities of known importers
were stopped it would often be possible for a foreign manufacturer to
find another importer. For these reasons the Panel believed that there
could be an objective need in terms of Article XX(d) to apply limited in
rem exclusion orders to imported products.'
34
In rem exclusion orders apply within the framework of
Article XX(d) because it is more difficult to take action at the
point of production of imported products. Therefore, GATT
consistent laws or regulations concerning the place of
production of imported goods can be enforced legally through
GATT inconsistent measures. Since the laws or regulations with
regard to the point of production are not limited to the
categories of laws or regulations listed in Article XX(d), laws
and regulations enforced under paragraph (d) can differ from
the enumerated categories. Therefore, by deduction, the list
recorded in Article XX(d) is neither exhaustive nor specific.
133. See Section 337 Panel, supra note 33, at 394. The Panel stated in the same
paragraph that the 'in rem exclusion orders to imported products applies, although
no equivalent remedy is applied against domestically-produced products." The in
rem actions must, however, meet the other requirements with regard to the term of
"necessary" and to the introductory phrase.
134. Id.
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(b) Necessary "to secure compliance with"135
Existing interpretations of the phrase "to secure compliance
with" have also taken a narrow view. The EEC Regulation
Panel, in its examination, confirmed that, "Article XX(d) covers
only measures related to the enforcement of obligations under
laws or regulations consistent with the [GATT] ."136 The Panel
excluded interpretations meaning "to enforce obligations under
laws and regulations."137 Actions enforcing the obligations must
therefore be distinguished from actions only related to the
enforcement of these obligations. GATT inconsistent measures
are authorized if they are linked to the enforcement of
obligations under laws or regulations consistent with GATT
provisions. It is obvious that requiring this link narrows a
party's choice of measures. Since the main purpose of the GATT
is the establishment and furtherance of free trade between
contracting parties, a narrow definition of measures eradicating
free trade is not surprising. This interpretation preempts the
use of Article XX(d) for human rights measures.
(c) Invocation For Human Rights Purposes
As a general rule, any application of Article XX(d) measures
must be necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations
that are not inconsistent with GATT provisions. Because the
GATT is devoted exclusively to free trade issues, it does not
embody any human rights. In short, the GATT simply does not
address these standards. 138 Therefore, any invocation of human
rights is inconsistent with the provisions of the GATT. Thus,
Article XX(d) cannot be the basis to authorize GATT
inconsistent measures necessary to secure compliance with laws
or regulations concerning human rights. Any GATT inconsistent
measures necessary to secure compliance with laws or
135. See Section 337 Panel, supra note 33, at 392-93 (detailing the usage of the
term "necessary"). The term "necessary" has already been defined. Since this
definition can be applied to GATT inconsistent measures based on Article XX(d),
there does not seem to be any need for further examination of "necessary."
136. EEC Regulation Panel, supra note 113, at 1114.
137. Id.
138. If human rights were considered within the framework of the GATT, the
balance of the GATT specific rights and obligations and, therefore, the purpose of
the entire GATT could be jeopardized. The purpose of"provisions of this Agreement"
seems to confirm the dominance of free trade concerns over any other worries. See
also EEC Regulation Panel, supra note 113, at 1101 (stating Japan's position with
regard to unfair trading practices).
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regulations not referred to in the GATT or having a link with its
provisions, therefore, constitute illegal acts under the GATT.
However, this is not correct for a particular category of
international law provisions, namelyjus cogens norms.
(d) The Exception: Norms of Jus Cogens
The above analysis of human rights does not include jus
cogens norms because of the peremptory nature of jus cogens
norms. The Vienna Convention underlines the peremptory
character of this rule:
A treaty is void, if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a
peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of the
present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is
a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of
States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and
which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general
international law having the same character.
139
In the case of new jus cogens norms, which did not exist at
the time of the conclusion of the treaty, the Vienna Convention
states that, "[i]f a new peremptory norm of general international
law emerges, any existing treaty which is in conflict with that
norm becomes void and terminates."140  Therefore, no
internationally binding treaty can violate jus cogens norms. 141 If
a treaty infringes jus cogens norms, it becomes void and
terminates. It does not matter whether the treaty is in conflict
with ajus cogens norm at the time of its conclusion or whether it
violates a new jus cogens norm that did not exist at the time of
139. Vienna Convention, supra note 56, art. 53, at 698. It is true that the
concept of jus cogens was a subject of controversy among States and international
jurists. However, its incorporation in the Vienna Convention is evidence that the
community of States has accepted it. For a more detailed analysis of the jus cogens
concept see Gomez A. Robledo, Le jus cogens international: sa gen~se, sa nature, ses
functions, 172 RECUEIL DES COURS DE L' ACADIMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE LA
HAYE 9-217 (1981). For a critical point of view concerning the creation ofjus cogens
norms, see Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77
AM. J. INT'L L. 413, 423 (1983).
140. Vienna Convention, supra note 56, art. 64, at 703.
141. See Reports of the International Law Commission on the Second Part of its
Seventeenth Session and on its Eighteenth Session, U.N. DOC. A/6309/Rev.1 (1966),
reprinted in [1966] 2 Y.B. Int'l Comm'n 247-48 (listing examples proposed by the
International Law Commission including treaties contemplating an unlawful use of
force contrary to the principles of the Charter, treaties contemplating the
performance of any other act criminal under international law or treaties
contemplating or conniving at the commission of acts, such as trade in slaves, piracy
or genocide).
20011
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
the treaty's establishment. Since domestic law must accord with
international law, domestic law cannot violate jus cogens
norms. 142
The GATT is not exempt from this line of analysis. In short,
the GATT cannot contradict jus cogens norms. Laws or
regulations with regard to jus cogens norms cannot be
inconsistent with either the GATT or its provisions; otherwise,
the GATT would be void. Thus, GATT inconsistent measures
based on laws or regulations based on jus cogens rules
automatically become legal by right.143 This applies in all cases
with regard to jus cogens norms. It applies even if the GATT
does not link or refer to jus cogens norms. This rule becomes
clearer when considered in conjunction with erga omnes
obligations.
The concept of erga omnes obligations is similar to norms of
jus cogens. The International Court of Justice defined erga
omnes obligations as "obligations of a State towards the
international community as a whole." 144 Because erga omnes
obligations are by their nature concerns of all nations, "all
States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection." 45
Thus, a treaty that authorizes slavery would be void as contrary
tojus cogens, and acts constituting slavery would be in breach of
the erga omnes obligation with regard to the prohibition of
slavery. Because "all States.. .have a legal interest" in the
outlawing of slavery, any nation could take legal action to end
such activity. 146
While Article XX(d) generally bars laws or regulations
concerning human rights that are inconsistent with the GATT,
the foregoing discussion demonstrates that the GATT conflict
with jus cogens norms and that domestic law must accord with
142. See supra note 56; see also supra note 122 and accompanying text
(discussing Article 27 of the Vienna Convention).
143. In order to authorize Article XX(d) measures, the other two requirements of
the application condition must also be met. See EEC Regulation Panel, supra note
113, at 1113.
144. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J.
4, 32 [hereinafter Barcelona Traction]; see also MAURIZIO RAGAZZI, THE CONCEPT OF
INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES (1997) (discussing the obligations erga
omnes).
145. The International Court of Justice listed as examples of erga omnes: the
outlawing of acts of aggression, of aggression and the protection of principles and
rules concerning basic rights of the human person including the protection from
slavery and racial discrimination. Barcelona Traction, supra note 144, at 32.
146. See id.
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international law.147 It follows, then, that laws or regulations
regarding jus cogens norms are "not inconsistent" with GATT
provisions. Therefore, if it can be demonstrated that human
rights are regarded as jus cogens norms, laws or regulations
concerning these standards would be consistent with the
provisions of the GATT.
Whether human rights should be considered as jus cogens
norms is a controversial issue. Customary human rights laws
"are based on principles of concern to all States and protect
interests which are not limited to a particular State or group of
States. '148 Therefore, they are very similar to jus cogens norms.
However, despite their similarity, no authoritative body has
used them synonymously. The human rights examples
concerning erga omnes obligations provided by the International
Court of Justice can surely be regarded as jus cogens rules. 149
The human rights referred to in this article are also
undoubtedly regarded as customary international rules. Their
nature asjus cogens norms is nevertheless questionable.
(e) The Example of Forced Labor
The illegality of forced labor is one human right that has
received the status as a jus cogens norm. An Inquiry
Commission of the International Labor Organization
(hereinafter ILO Commission)15 ° confirmed this, stating that,
"there exists now in international law a peremptory norm
147. See id.
148. OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE, 343
(1991).
149. See Barcelona Traction, supra note 144, at 32.
150. This Commission is certainly not empowered to legislate binding
international law. As a body of an international Organization, it can, however,
contribute to the creation of international law:
La formation de la coutume s'appuie sur l'ensemble des agissements des
sujets du droit international.. .1 suffit que les agissements 6manent de
sujets de droit international - ttats, mais aussi organisations
internationales,. . et que ces agissements soient opposables A leur auteur,
donc ne soient pas vicis... Les organisations internationales participent
6galement A la formation du droit international g~n~ral par les rdsolutions
qu'elles adoptent, par les conventions internationales quxquelles elles
participent, et par l'ensemble de leurs relations avec d'autres sujets de
droit international.
NGUYEN Quoc DINH, PATRICK DAILLIER & ALAIN PELLET, DROIT INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC 317-18 (5th ed. 1994). Reports of this Commission can, undoubtedly, also be
regarded as interpretation tools of the various ILO Conventions. Thus, the legal
value of these reports should not be underestimated.
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prohibiting any recourse to forced labor and that the rights not
to be compelled to perform forced or compulsory labor is one of
the basic human rights."'5 '
The Commission based its conclusion on a number of
sources and factors: (1) the Forced Labor Convention, 1930 (No.
29); (2) the fact that many States have prohibited forced labor at
the constitutional level; (3) the fact that numerous international
human rights instruments explicitly banned forced labor; (4) the
fact that forced labor was closely related to the protection of
other basic human rights; and (5) the provisions of international
law of armed conflict prohibiting forced labor. 152 Furthermore,
because forced labor is regarded as a slavery-like practice,
international law's prohibition on slavery also applies to forced
labor.15 3 The uniform opposition to slavery is recognized as both
a jus cogens norm 54 and an obligation erga omnes.15 5 Moreover,
a serious violation on a widespread scale of the slavery-
prohibiting obligation can be qualified as an international
crime. 5 6 Thus, forced labor can be considered as an obligation
erga omnes and its violation can be regarded as an international
crime.
Because of its status as jus cogens, an authorized
application of GATT inconsistent measures could be based on
laws or regulations with regard to forced labor. This conclusion
is supported by the fact that WTO panels have considered
international law in their deliberations. For example, the
Gasoline Appellate Report confirmed that, "the General
Agreement is not to be read in clinical isolation from public
international law."157 Using thejus cogens analysis, it is possible
151. Report of the Commission of Inquiry appointed under article 26 of the
Constitution of the International Labor Organization to examine the observance by
Myanmar of the Forced Labor Convention, 1930 (No. 29), July 2, 1998, para. 203, at
http://www.ilo.org/public/englishlstandards/relm/gb/docs/gb273/myanmar.htm.
152. See id. at para. 202.
153. See id. at para. 198.
154. See International Law Commission, supra note 141, at 247-48.
155. See Barcelona Traction, supra note 144, at 32; see also supra notes 145-46
and accompanying text.
156. See I. L. C. Draft Articles on State Responsibility Article 19(3)(c), I. L. C. 's
1996 Report, G. A. 0. R., 51st Sess., Supp. 10, p. 125
157. WTO Appellate Body Report on United States: Standards for Reformulated
and Conventional Gasoline, 35 I.L.M. 603, 621 (Apr. 29, 1996) [hereinafter Gasoline
Appellate Report]. Nevertheless, some areas of international law are very vague. To
name just a few, the interpretation of existing rules and the customary nature of
international law raise serious and controversial questions. Given that the panels
specialize in trade questions, they might lack the knowledge to examine these
serious yet important issues. In the past, panels used various methods to find
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that Article XX(d) could be used for human rights measures.
D. NECESSARY To ACHIEVE POLICY GOALS
1. Current Interpretations of the Necessary Prong
Once a nation has demonstrated that a measure falls within
one of the enumerated General Exceptions, it must prove that
the measure is necessary to fulfill the policy objective. 158 The
Section 337 Panel was the first to define "necessary" in the
context of an assessment of a GATT inconsistent measure. 159
The Panel found that a party could not invoke Article XX as
necessary when a reasonable alternative measure existed and
when that measure was not inconsistent with "other GATT
provisions available to it."160 In cases where a reasonable
alternative does not exist, a party must adopt the measure
"which entails the least degree of inconsistency with other
GATT provisions."161 Under this standard, it is the individual
measure in question that must meet the "necessary" criterion
and not the various social policies listed under Article XX.162 The
Section 337 Panel confirmed this, concluding:
If the term 'necessary' were interpreted to refer not to the
answers to these questions. See Salmon Panel, supra, note 84, at Annex 2 (seeking of
advice from experts); Thai Cigarettes Panel, supra, note 83, at 1138-39 (referencing
decisions, resolutions and recommendations of specialized international
Organizations); Gasoline Appellate Report, supra, at 618-23 (mentioning cases
adjudicated by the International Court of Justice or by regional courts).
158. See Gasoline Panel, supra note 38, at 296.
159. See Section 337 Panel, supra note 33, at 392. Once adopted, this
interpretation created binding precedent for other WTO Panels. References to
previous adjudications are a common habit in international public law. Only through
taking into considerations previous judgments, can a coherent interpretation of
various principles be possible. Although panel reports do not and should not be
regarded as binding precedents, correct and logical panel decisions are to be
coherent and previous cases will always provide material for analysis and analogy.
Various panels have confirmed this, stating that: "[Adopted panel reports] create
legitimate expectations among WTO Members, and, therefore, should be taken into
account where they are relevant to any dispute." See also Periodicals Panel, supra
note 128, at para. 5.7 (adopting the approach of a previous panel for an analysis of
Article XX(d)) For more on the jurisprudential role of GATT or WTO dispute panels,
see Jeffrey Waincmyer, Reformulated Gasoline Under Reformulated WTO Dispute
Settlement Procedures: Pulling Pandora out of a Chapeau?, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 141,
178 (1996) and Klabbers, supra note 49, at 65.
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inconsistency requiring justification but to the health policy itself, then
GATT panels would have to pass judgment on the justification of the
contracting party's health policy itself rather than the trade measure
implementing it, and this in spite of the absence of any guidance on
this issue in Article XX(b). One can safely assume that the drafters of
the General Agreement, had they considered that only 'necessary'
health policies could be implemented through trade restrictions, would
have given some guidance on the criteria to be used in assessing the
necessity of the contracting parties' health policies. 1
6 3
With regard to the substantive definition of the term
necessary, a measure would not be regarded as necessary under
Article XX if an alternative measure is available that is not
inconsistent with other GATT provisions and which a
contracting party can reasonably be expected to employ. A
contracting party, therefore, cannot resort to exceptional
measures before exhausting other reasonably available
alternative measures. However, if a GATT consistent
alternative measure is not available, a contracting party is
obligated to employ the least restrictive trade measure
reasonably available to it.
Panels analyzing the term "necessary" with regard to
Article XX(b) have referred to the first definition, used in the
Section 337 Panel. 16 The Thai Cigarettes Panel, for example,
saw no reason why the understanding of the term "necessary"
under paragraph (d) should not be the same as in paragraph (b).
Following this line of reasoning, the panel stated that:
In both paragraphs the same term was used and the same objective
intended: to allow contracting parties to impose trade restrictive
measures inconsistent with the General Agreement to pursue
overriding public policy goals to the extent that such inconsistency
were unavoidable. The fact that paragraph (d) applies to
inconsistencies resulting from the enforcement of GATT-consistent
laws and regulations while paragraph (b) applies to those resulting
from health-related policies therefore did not justify a different
interpretation of the term "necessary."
1 65
163. Roessler, supra note 109, at 34-35.
164. See Section 337 Panel, supra note 33; see also supra note 159 and
accompanying text.
165. Thai Cigarettes Panel, supra note 83, at 1138. Charnovitz criticizes this
analogy. See Charnovitz, supra note 50, at 50. He argues that there is a distinction
between the measures "necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations"
within the framework of paragraph(d) and the measures "necessary to protect life
and health." Id. Since the Panel examined the sole term of "necessary" and not the
"necessity" of the different social policies, Charnovitz's criticism may be rejected. As
the following debate about the definition of "necessary" will show, the "necessary"
measure has to be distinguished from the social policy in question.
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The consistent application of the Section 337 Panel
definition has allowed GATT and WTO panels' great consistency
while nonetheless creating a number of problems.
2. Problems with the Current Interpretation
The construction of the necessary prong currently employed
by GATT and WTO panels is too narrow. It is unclear in parts
and therefore does not contribute to a satisfactory
understanding of Article XX. In other parts, the panels'
interpretation does not correspond to the meaning of the
General Exceptions clause. As a result, the interpretation of
necessary is misleading.
(a) Reasonably Available Alternative Measure
The central problem with the panels' definition is its
insistence on exhaustion of reasonably available GATT
consistent measures. This rule potentially serves to limit the
options available to developing nations. For example, although
the Section 337 Panel clearly stated that this requirement does
not compel contracting parties to change the substantive policy
for which an Article XX measure was invoked, 166 the outcome of
the policy may depend on the measures employed for its
realization. By requiring the use of different measures to
achieve the policy, the interpretation injures a nation limited by
political, economic, technical and cultural conditions. These
conditions might obligate it to apply the GATT inconsistent
measure. As a result, the contracting country would not fulfill
the necessary requirement and its non-conforming measure
could not be accepted under the General Exceptions clause.
The current definition is also limited by its failure to
consider the efficiency concerns of social policy.
It would be consistent with the language of the necessity test as
currently interpreted for a GATT panel to find that a measure
significantly less effective in achieving the non-trade purpose would
nonetheless be identified by the panel as "reasonably available," and
166. See Section 337 Panel, supra note 33, at 392-93. The Panel stated that a
contracting party could not be asked to change its substantive patent law and such
level of enforcement of that law, provided that imported and domestically produced
products are treated equally if a contracting party could reasonably secure that level
of enforcement in a manner that is not inconsistent with other GATT provisions. See
id.
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therefore serve as the basis for invalidating the chosen measure. 167
The Tuna-Dolphin Panel, for example, referred to the
possibility of international co-operative arrangements as a
possible alternative and then held that the measure in question
was not necessary. 168 This holding ignored United States'
concerns that dispute settlement efforts under such an
international arrangement were not productive or practically
efficient.169 When attempts were made to use these
arrangements, the claimant, Mexico, was unwilling to
cooperate. 70  In cases like this, country-specific import
prohibitions on certain products might be the only means for the
achievement of the purposes enumerated in Article XX.
Moreover, some social policies might be so urgent so as to
necessitate the implementation of GATT inconsistent measures.
Under such a scenario, the GATT consistent measures could
prove unsatisfactory. Given the rulings of the panels, GATT
consistent measures must be given priority even though they
may be less efficient in achieving the purpose of the social policy
than GATT inconsistent ones. In the panels' views, the criterion
of consistency prevails over all other concerns. 171
(b) Least Trade Restrictive Measure
The portions of the current rule requiring nations to use the
least trade restrictive measure are also flawed. For example, the
link between necessary and least trade restrictive measures
does not correspond to the wording of Article XX(b). 7 2 The
definition of "necessary" is wrong because:
[iut [the definition of necessary] does not accord with the grammar and
syntax of Article XX(b) [paragraphs (a) and (d) included]. The word
"necessary" in this provision is part of a purpose clause that has as its
object the protection of living things. The "least trade restrictive"
interpretation turns the clause on its head: "necessary" no longer
related to the protection of living things, but to whether or not the
167. Garcia, supra note 11, at 84.
168. See Tuna-Dolphin Panel, supra note 32, at 199 (stating that "It]he United
States had not demonstrated to the Panel... that it had exhausted all options
reasonably available to it to pursue its dolphin protection objectives through
measures consistent with the General Agreement, in particular through the
negotiation of international co-operative arrangements").
169. See Christensen & Geffin, supra note 105, at 588.
170. See id.
171. See id. at 586.
172. See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Reconciling Trade and Protection of the
Environment, 91 AM. J. INT'L. L. 268-76 (1997).
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measure is a "necessary" departure from the trade agreement .... 173
This analysis is correct because the term necessary refers to
the object of the protection. Thus, the protective character of the
measure should prevail over the trade implications. The
definition used by the panels does not suggest that, in cases
where a GATT consistent measure is not available, the measure
most "necessary" for the achievement of the purposes listed in
Article XX must be applied. 174 The realization of these purposes
therefore is less important than the nature of the measure
invoked. In giving priority to the least trade restrictive
measures, the definition "turns the clause on its head."1 75 The
purposes of Article XX are sacrificed for the free trade objective
and the predominant position of the free trade concern is once
again confirmed.
A second criticism, raised by author Steven Charnovitz,
criticizes the definition of necessary by asking how the "least
degree of inconsistency" with other GATT provisions can be
determined.1 76 He sees the difficulty in the fact that "[a]ll GATT
provisions presumably would count in such a calculation. But
how should one weigh an action inconsistent with Article XI, for
example, against an alternative inconsistent with Article
XIII?"117 Neither the WTO panels nor Charnovitz has been able
to provide an answer to this question. A rearrangement of the
definition of the term "necessary" could prove helpful to resolve
this unanswered question. The concerns listed in paragraphs
(a), (b) and (d) of Article XX could then replace the "least
restrictive trade" measure.
The narrow definition of necessary is, from a certain point
of view, very close to the interpretation of the introductory
phrase of Article XX. If GATT consistent alternative measures
were reasonably available, a resort to Article XX measures
would constitute an arbitrary or unjustifiable restriction. The
use of the least trade restrictive criterion is also very close to the
use of unjustifiable discrimination in the introductory phrase.
The panels have, indeed, incorporated the introductory phrase
within the definition of "necessary."178 In doing so, they have
173. Id.
174. See Section 337 Panel, supra note 33, at 392-93.
175. Schoenbaum, supra note 172 and accompanying text.
176. See Charnovitz, supra note 50, at 49.
177. Id.
178. See Schoenbaum, supra note 172, at 277. "It is no wonder that panels have
found it unnecessary to examine whether a measure meets the tests set out in the
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created a very high threshold for the term necessary. A clear
separation of the assessment of necessary from the introductory
phrase would lower this threshold and simultaneously allow
clarification in the interpretation of necessary.
E. THE QUESTION OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY
In addition to the traditional three-step examination,
questions have arisen with regard to the interpretation of the
extraterritoriality 179 of Article XX in general, and paragraph (b)
in particular.5 0 The Tuna-Dolphin Panel examined the question
of the extraterritorial application of Article XX measures.' 8 ' In
that case, Mexico contested the United States ban on imports
because:
[niothing in Article XX entitled any contracting party to impose
measures in the implementation of which the jurisdiction of one
contracting party would be subordinated to the legislation of another
contracting party. It could be deduced from the letter and spirit of
Article XX that it was confined to measures contracting parties could
adopt or apply within or from their own territory. To accept that one
contracting party might impose trade restrictions to conserve the
resources of another contracting party would have the consequence of
introducing the concept of extraterritoriality into the GATT, which
would be extremely dangerous for all contracting parties.
182
Mexico based its argument on the absence of either
language explicitly permitting extraterritorial actions or other
indications implicitly authorizing extraterritorial measures. The
United States objected to characterization of its measures as
extraterritorial, arguing that, "[tihese measures simply specified
the products that could be marketed in the territory of the
United States."' 83 The United States also argued that its
measures were "necessary to protect the life and health of
chapeau: arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries or a disguised
restriction on international trade. Their interpretation of 'necessary' makes these
tests unnecessary." Id.
179. "Extraterritorial" trade measure refers to measures that seek to regulate
behavior outside of the country.
180. The "extraterritorial" debate is not solely limited to paragraph (b), but
rather concerns the entire Article XX. Nevertheless, the following discussion will
concentrate on paragraphs (a), (b), and (d). Particular reference will be made to
paragraph (b). By means of analogy, the conclusions pertaining to paragraph (b) can
be applied analogously to paragraphs (a) and (d).
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dolphins" 18 4 and were therefore consistent with Article XX(b).
However, the Panel rejected that argument as a defense of the
"extraterritorial" principle.185 On the other hand, Mexico
successfully argued that Article XX(b) "referred to protection of
the life and health of humans and animals within the territory
of the contracting party protecting them."1 8 6
Overall, the Tuna-Dolphin Panel confirmed that the
wording of Article XX(b) did not provide a clear solution to the
dispute:
[tihe basic question.. .whether Article XX(b) covers measures
necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health outside the
jurisdiction of the contracting party taking the measure, is not clearly
answered by the text of that provision. It refers to life and health
protection generally without expressly limiting that protection to the
jurisdiction of the contracting party concerned. The Panel therefore
decided to analyze this issue in the lights of the drafting history of
Article XX(b), the purpose of this provision, and the consequences that
the interpretations proposed by the parties would have for the
operation of the General Agreement as a whole. 187
The Panel's decision to refer to the drafting history, the
purpose, and the consequences of the provision are consistent
with well-accepted rules of interpretation. 8 8 The Panel began
its analysis with an examination of the drafting history and
concluded that, "the record indicates that the concerns of the
drafter of Article XX(b) focused on the use of sanitary measures
to safeguard life or health, animals or plants within the
jurisdiction of the importing country."18 9
While the Panel used conventional tools of interpretation,
184. Id.
185. See id. at 199.
186. Id. at 171.
187. Id. at 198.
188. See Vienna Convention, supra note 56, arts. 31, 32, at 691-92.
189. Tuna-Dolphin Panel, supra note 32, at 199. The Panel reasoned on the
issue extensively, noting that
the proposal for Article XX(b) dated from the Draft Charter of the
International Trade Organization (ITO) proposed by the United States,
which stated in Article 32, Nothing in Chapter IV [on commercial policy] of
this Charter shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by
any Member of measures.. .(b) necessary to protect human, animal or
plant life or health. In the New York Draft of the ITO Charter, the
preamble had been revised to read as it does at present, and exception (b)
read: 'For the purpose of protecting human, animal or plant life or health, if
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its approach in this case was flawed in two principal ways.
First, the Panel's interpretation of the drafting history and its
unique reference to that drafting history are controversial. The
legislative history on the International Convention for the
Abolition of Import and Export Prohibitions (hereinafter 1927
Convention) may not actually support the panel's
interpretation. 190 Discussions about the extent of the "General
Exceptions" occurred during the negotiations of the 1927
Convention. Given that the "General Exceptions" in the ITO
Charter were equivalent to the 1927 Convention, there was no
need for "rehashing the obvious."191 Therefore, the Panel should
have looked at the drafting history of the equivalent Article of
the 1927 Convention to resolve the debate about the
extraterritorial applicability of Article XX. 192
The Panel also may have erred in its understanding of the
deleted section of the New York Draft of the current Article
XX(b)' 93 The proposal was deleted because of its confusing
language, not as the Panel suggests, because Article XX(b) was
meant to be restricted to domestic jurisdiction or domestic
sanitary measures. 94 Moreover, if the drafters intended to
restrict the application of Article XX(b) to sanitary measures,
"they could have referred specifically to 'sanitary' measures ... [a
term] with a well understood meaning within international
trade parlance at the time of the initial GATT negotiations."195
Even if the New York Draft proposal could be understood to
restrict the application of Article XX(b) to domestic measures,
its removal would contradict the Tuna-Dolphin Panel's
190. See International Convention for the Abolition of Import and Export
Prohibitions and Restrictions; Nov. 8, 1927. Although ratified by a number of
countries, this Convention ultimately failed.
191. See Charnovitz, supra note 50, at 44.
192. See Christensen and Geffin, supra note 105, at 583. "These earlier
negotiations clearly established that laws to 'protect human, animal or plant life or
health' included measures to prevent the 'degeneration or extinction' of animals, as
well as to protect animals and plants from imported pests and diseases." Id.
193. The original suggestion for Article XX(b) was the same as the current
language. Upon a proposal made by Belgium and Luxembourg, the following was
added to the original suggestion during the New York Draft phase of the ITO
Charter: "if corresponding domestic safeguards under similar conditions exist in the
importing country." See UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL,
DRAFTING COMMITTEE OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE OF THE UNITED NATIONS
CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT, TECHNICAL SUB-COMMITTEE, U.N. DOC.
E/PC/T/C.6/41. The final text of the ITO Charter this proposal was, however,
rejected.
194. See Charnovitz, supra note 50, at 44.
195. Christensen & Geffin, supra note 105, at 585.
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interpretation.
In referring exclusively to the drafting history of Article
XX(b), the Panel overlooked the other criterion necessary for its
proper interpretation. Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention
indicates clearly that the terms of a treaty shall be interpreted
according to their context. 196 With regard to human rights, labor
standards and environmental concerns, the international
context has changed radically since the end of the World War II.
Consideration of these questions has shifted from domestic
jurisdictions to international spheres. They have become a
concern of the community of states, some of which have gained
the status of customary international law, erga omnes
obligations and jus cogens. In a proper examination of the
extraterritorial principle, this has to be taken into account. 197
Because of their new status, these concerns override the concept
of "extraterritoriality." With regard to the environment, "[ilt is
well established as a matter of international law that states
have an obligation to prevent damage to both the environment
of other states and areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction."198 Much the same can be said with regard to
human rights, such as slavery, forced labor and racial
discrimination. As such, the state's sovereignty and
independence to direct the outcome of its own domestic concerns
has eroded. 199
Some authors, nevertheless, have defended the Tuna-
Dolphin Panel's conclusion of the non-extraterritorial
application of Article XX(b) measures. Worries about the
unilateral imposition of domestic yardsticks led one critic to
argue that:
[t]he tuna ban violates the GATT not because of any inherent policy
against conservation but because the GATT rightly protects member
196. "A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context...." Vienna
Convention, supra note 56, art. 31(1), at 691.
197. The United States referred to the flexibility afforded by Article XX to take
account of new methods of manufacture and commerce that had taken place. See
EEC Regulation Panel, supra note 113, at 1109.
198. Schoenbaum, supra note 172, at 280.
199. States still have the right to decide, however, through their constitutional
process, whether or not to ratify conventions. It is up to them to determine whether
they accept formal obligations. Once they have freely accepted these obligations,
they do have a legal responsibility to comply. The big number of international
human rights instruments and the customary character of these rights are the
reasons for the narrowing of the concept of sovereignty. See Steger, supra, note 123
at 138 (discussing the specific question of sovereignty and the GATT).
2001]
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
states from the unilateral imposition of domestic standards by
importing countries through market access restrictions... If every
country were allowed to impose its own domestic environmental
standards on other countries, the result would not be greater
environmental protection but chaos and anarchy.
200
With regard to human rights and environmental standards,
this argument must be rejected. These standards are no longer
domestic standards; they have become the concern of the
community of states.20 1 Furthermore, the critique seems to
forget that every member country must fulfill the application
conditions of any Article XX measure. Since these conditions are
very narrowly defined, the employment of the measures in
question would rarely lead to chaos and anarchy. 202
Other critics reject extraterritoriality because it is likely to
require panels to make decisions about policy goals. Since the
successful extraterritorial application of any import restriction
is necessary if it is the only measure reasonably available to
persuade other countries to change their policy, the question of
reasonably available measures will lead panels to make
decisions based on the wrong set of criteria.20 3 Panels would be
obligated to answer difficult technical questions like:
Would an interruption of diplomatic relations have been sufficient?
Would a refusal of landing rights for the national airline have induced
a policy change? Or the removal from the list of beneficiaries of GSP
tariff preferences? These examples show that an extra-jurisdictional
interpretation of Article XX would force panels to assess the foreign
policy options of Contracting Parties and the effectiveness of applying
alternative means of exerting pressure available to them. . .However,
it seems unlikely that in practice the United States and other
contracting parties to the GATT would [not] be ready to accept an
interpretation of Article XX according to which the scope of their
trading rights and obligations would vary with foreign policy means
available to them to coerce other countries into a change of their
200. Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Free International Trade and Protection of the
Environment: Irreconcilable Conflict?, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 700, 703 (1992). This
argument is very similar to the one used in Tuna-Dolphin Panel, supra note 32, at
393.
201. It is true that differences exist between the various social policies of
different countries, that conflicts of values exist among the countries and that it is,
therefore, difficult to agree upon common criteria for the various social policies. But
this is no reason to prevent "extraterritorial" measures for any kind of concerns.
Since the rights in question are the most universally recognized rights, the above-
mentioned arguments become irrelevant.
202. See Shrimp-Turtle Panel, supra note 107.
203. See Roessler, supra note 109, at 35.
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domestic policies. 204
This skepticism about unilateral state action is
unwarranted. Given that any application of foreign policy means
will either be approved or rejected by panels (which define the
conditions for such applications very narrowly), any state abuse
of extraterritorial measures based on Article XX can be ruled
out. WTO panels can control the extraterritorial misuse of
foreign policy within the framework of Article XX. Additionally,
the proposal in question, human rights, is limited to universal
standards. Thus, at least in this context, states have no reason
to be afraid of extraterritorial applicability of Article XX
measures.
The drafters did not specify any thoughts about the
extraterritorial criterion with regard to the four paragraphs
dealing with social policies. In addition to paragraphs (a), (b),
and (d), paragraph (e) does not refer to any extraterritorial
application. 205 However, given that measures based on Article
XX(e) relate to products made by prison labor, any restrictions
on their import would have an extraterritorial effect. The
drafters must have been aware of that fact. The logical
deduction of the drafters' silence is that they approved
"extraterritorial" actions with regard to prison labor. If the
drafters had a different logic in mind for the other paragraphs,
and particularly for paragraphs (a), (b), and (d), they certainly
would have expressed this intention in the text of the said
paragraphs. Because the wording of these paragraphs does not
contain anything with regard to the extraterritoriality of the
measures in question, as is the case in paragraph (e), the
conclusion established for the latter paragraph can also be
applied to these paragraphs. Thus, measures based on
paragraphs (a), (b), and (d) of Article XX, just as measures
justified on Article XX(e), can possess an extraterritorial
component.
IV. CONCLUSION
Paragraphs (a), (b), and (d) of Article XX historically have
been defined very narrowly. Within the WTO, the free trade
204. Id.
205. See infra Section IIC(2)(b) (delineating the text of paragraph (e) and
providing an analogue argumentation with regard to Article XX measures based on
MPP).
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purpose of the GATT has been given priority over issues such as
human or animal life and the environment. No panel has so far
dealt with human rights as such. From the existing decisions it
appears that a WTO panel would reject a reference to human
rights for GATT inconsistent measures. Arguments concerning
unjustified discrimination, disguised trade restriction,
protectionism, extraterritoriality, sovereignty and the
availability of GATT consistent measures have led the panels to
the rejection of claims with regard to human or animal life and
the environment. Many of the same arguments would be used
for rejecting human rights concerns.
This article, however, has shown that the panels'
arguments justifying the rejection of GATT inconsistent
measures, with regard to Article XX(a), (b), and (d), are unwise
and that they can be challenged. Thus, rejecting the
consideration of "human rights " in Article XX(a), (b), and (d)
would be wrong.
The main reason for objecting to the panels' decisions
concerns the predominance given to free trade. It is true that
the GATT is meant to deal primarily with free trade concerns.
The General Exceptions clause in Article XX is meant to
override these concerns and to prevail over any provision of the
GATT. Even the most important provisions establishing free
trade can be overridden. Under the provisions of Article XX the
balance must be in favor of non-trade issues, such as human
rights. By continually deferring to free trade the WTO panels
continue to ignore the purpose of Article XX.
The trade-focused bias of the panels is also in contradiction
with the concept of norms of jus cogens. Since these norms
cannot be violated, the predominance of free trade issues over
human rights is in violation of international law. Furthermore,
their erga omnes character makes them a concern of the
international community. Thus, every State has a legal interest
for the protection of these human rights. Sovereignty or
extraterritorial arguments rejecting Article XX measures
accordingly become void.
While the world agrees in its condemnation of abuses of
human rights, it had not yet agreed on a formal measure to
address these concerns. While the GATT is not the mechanism
for a systematic human rights regulatory system, it provides a
means to address trade related concerns via Article XX.
Therefore, Article XX should be reinterpreted and used for its
intended purpose.
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